(a) “Person” means every natural person, firm, copartnership, association, or corporation.
(b) “Driver” means every person who is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon a highway or who is exercising control over or steering a vehicle being towed by a motor vehicle.
(c) “Owner” means a person who holds the legal title of a vehicle or, in the event a vehicle is the subject of an agreement for the conditional sale or lease thereof with the right of purchase upon performance of the conditions stated in the agreement and with an immediate right of possession vested in the conditional vendee or lessee or in the event a mortgagor of a vehicle is entitled to possession, then the conditional vendee or lessee or mortgagor shall be deemed the owner for the purpose of this chapter.
History. Acts 1937, No. 280, § 3; Pope's Dig., § 6827; Acts 1953, No. 85, § 1; 1959, No. 307, § 5; 1969, No. 300, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 75-303; Acts 1993, No. 445, § 2.
Case Notes
Where a motorcycle ridden by a minor and a car driven by the defendant collided, it was not reversible error to refuse to instruct the jury that a minor should not be held to the same standard of care as an adult and that a higher degree of care is owed to minors, as this section and §§ 27-16-207, 27-51-201, 27-51-208 - 27-51-211, and 27-51-308, pertaining to safety on the highways, disclose no distinction between the degree of care to be exercised by a minor and an adult. Harrelson v. Whitehead, 236 Ark. 325, 365 S.W.2d 868 (1963).
Employer who caused truck which he had control of to be set in motion and to be operated was a “person” within the meaning of the provisions of § 27-37-205 prohibiting a person from operating a motor truck without flares and warning signals. Taylor v. Purifoy, 247 Ark. 368, 445 S.W.2d 485 (1969).
Cited: Red Top Driv-Ur Self Co. v. Munger, 229 Ark. 998, 320 S.W.2d 97 (1959).