This section does not apply to collisions that occur in a residential district. Burchfield v. Carroll, 255 Ark. 245, 499 S.W.2d 620 (1973).

This section does not apply to stops arising out of the exigencies of traffic. Burchfield v. Carroll, 255 Ark. 245, 499 S.W.2d 620 (1973); Mack v. Wilkerson, 304 Ark. 114, 801 S.W.2d 26 (1990).

Where there was evidence that defendant failed to park its truck as required by this section, the defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict. United Transports, Inc. v. Johnson, 215 Ark. 411, 220 S.W.2d 814 (1949).

The action of persons in deliberately leaving their vehicles, after a minor collision, in such a position so as to block the entire east lane of traffic on a main artery highway at dusky dark in violation of this section was such that reasonable men might conclude that the action constituted actionable negligence, proximately causing or contributing to the cause of a second collision and that a fact question was made as to their negligence, if any, for determination by the jury, so that a directed verdict relieving them from liability constituted error. Shearer v. Morgan, 240 Ark. 616, 401 S.W.2d 21 (1966).

Where truck developed motor trouble, and driver was forced to stop truck partly on shoulder and partly on paved portion of highway, and driver put out flares and later attempted to have truck towed to safety, but was again forced to leave it partly on highway, with about five inches of it extending over highway, and he again set out flares and made a phone call presumably for assistance, the parking of the truck came within exception to this section prohibiting parking on highways. Waycaster v. Sorenson, 124 F. Supp. 892 (W.D. Ark. 1954).

In action for damages caused by collision with unlighted rear of truck, instruction predicating liability upon finding that failure to provide taillight was proximate cause of damages was erroneous because taillight could have been extinguished by means other than defendant's negligence. Floyd v. Johnson, 193 Ark. 518, 100 S.W.2d 975 (1937) (decision under prior law).

In action for injuries to occupants of automobile struck by truck approaching in opposite direction while passing another momentarily stopped truck from the rear, instruction in the language of this section was prejudicial to defendant absent evidence that the truck was parked on the highway, since it would permit the jury to find that it was unlawful in any event to stop a motor vehicle on the highway. A.S. Barboro & Co. v. James, 205 Ark. 53, 168 S.W.2d 202 (1943).

In action for recovery of damages sustained in automobile accident where trial court gave defendant's instruction modifying it by including verbatim one of plaintiff's instructions that purported to be verbatim of this section but which in fact omitted several words of the section, such error could not be assigned to the trial court. Riggan v. Langley, 238 Ark. 649, 383 S.W.2d 661 (1964).

Where the court gave an instruction requested by defendant, modifying it by including one requested by plaintiff which purported to state subsection (a) of this section verbatim, but which omitted certain words therefrom, the error in giving such instruction was invited by plaintiff and not assignable to the court. Riggan v. Langley, 238 Ark. 649, 383 S.W.2d 661 (1964).

Where the undisputed evidence showed the plaintiff had not parked her motor vehicle upon the traveled portion of the highway, but showed she momentarily stopped because of the exigencies of traffic, it was prejudicial error for the trial court, over the objections of the plaintiff, to include this section in the instructions. Toney v. Miller, 268 Ark. 795, 597 S.W.2d 102 (Ct. App. 1980), overruled, Eisner v. Fields, 67 Ark. App. 238, 998 S.W.2d 421 (1999).

Where the judge, in an automobile accident case, instructed the jury in accordance with this section and the applicable model jury instruction that no one should stop or park on the paved portion of the highway, but should leave an unobstructed width of highway for the passage of other vehicles, the parked vehicle to be visible for 200 feet in either direction, the jury was properly instructed that a violation of this section was evidence of negligence, and the trial judge did not err in failing to include the part of this section that states that a driver who violates this section shall be liable for any damages which proximately result from such violation, since to have included the omitted part of this section would have emphasized this section over the others and since the omitted part was in conflict with the applicable model jury instructions. Price v. Watkins, 283 Ark. 502, 678 S.W.2d 762 (1984).

Negligence of truck driver in not parking truck on shoulder of road, where truck was heavily loaded, tires on right rear wheels were flat, and shoulder was soft so that it would have been impossible to jack up the wheels, was for jury. Presley v. Schenebeck, 194 Ark. 1069, 110 S.W.2d 5 (1937) (decision under prior law).

Issue as to whether it is practical for a driver to drive vehicle off paved portion of highway before stopping is for the jury. American Bus Lines, Inc. v. Merritt, 221 Ark. 596, 254 S.W.2d 963 (Ark. 1953); Johnson Timber Corp. v. Sturdivant, 295 Ark. 622, 752 S.W.2d 241 (1988), set aside, 295 Ark. 663B, 758 S.W.2d 415 (Ark. 1988).

Driver of bus company was guilty of negligence in parking on paved highway near intersection with county gravel road where evidence showed that bus could have been parked off the pavement or that it could have been parked on gravel portion of county road. American Bus Lines, Inc. v. Merritt, 221 Ark. 596, 254 S.W.2d 963 (Ark. 1953).

Before guest could recover for injuries, the burden was upon her to prove that her injuries were caused by the host operating his automobile in a willful and wanton manner in disregard of guest's rights. Willful misconduct, or to operate an automobile in willful and wanton disregard of the rights of others, means something more than gross negligence. Willful negligence is greater in degree than gross negligence; to be willfully negligent one must be conscious of his conduct, that is, he must, in the light of surrounding circumstances, comprehend that his actions will naturally or probably result in injury. Poole v. James, 231 Ark. 810, 332 S.W.2d 833 (1960).

Trial court's findings that it was neither impossible nor impracticable to park a tractor-trailer truck with a flat tire off the traveled portion of the highway, as required by this section, and that such failure constituted contributory negligence, was supported by sufficient evidence to sustain findings. Butler v. Reynolds & Draper Lumber Co., 239 Ark. 135, 387 S.W.2d 607 (1965).

Provisions requiring 20 feet of pavement to remain clear and unobstructed opposite a standing vehicle were held to mean 20 feet of the paved or improved or main traveled part of the highway and not to mean 20 feet including the shoulder. Waycaster v. Sorenson, 124 F. Supp. 892 (W.D. Ark. 1954) (decision under prior law).

Temporary stopping by bus on paved portion of highway for purpose of discharging passengers constitutes a violation of this section, if stopping on paved portion is not justified. American Bus Lines, Inc. v. Merritt, 221 Ark. 596, 254 S.W.2d 963 (Ark. 1953).

This section does not prohibit any person from leaving a vehicle on the main-traveled portion of a highway when it is impossible to stop, park, or leave the vehicle off such portion of the highway. However, the statute requires that “in every event an unobstructed width of the highway opposite a standing vehicle shall be left for the free passage of other vehicles.” Johnson Timber Corp. v. Sturdivant, 295 Ark. 622, 752 S.W.2d 241 (1988), set aside, 295 Ark. 663B, 758 S.W.2d 415 (Ark. 1988).

Cited: Dacus v. State, 16 Ark. App. 222, 699 S.W.2d 417 (1985); Johnson Timber Corp. v. Sturdivant, 295 Ark. 622, 752 S.W.2d 241 (1988).