(a) (1) No person shall drive a vehicle on a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing.
(2) In every event, speed shall be so controlled as may be necessary to avoid colliding with any person, vehicle, or other conveyance on or entering the highway in compliance with legal requirements and the duty of all persons to use due care.
(b) (1) The maximum speed limits set forth in subsection (c) of this section shall not apply to controlled-access highways.
(2) (A) Upon an engineering and traffic investigation, the State Highway Commission shall determine the maximum permissible speeds on controlled-access highways which shall be effective when appropriate signs giving notice are erected along the highway.
(B) The commission shall fix the maximum permissible speed of trucks with one and one-half (1½) ton capacity or more at ten (10) miles per hour below the maximum permissible speed for automobiles.
(c) On all facilities other than controlled-access highways, except when a special hazard exists that requires lower speed for compliance with subsection (a) of this section, the limits specified in this section or established as authorized shall be maximum lawful speeds, and no person shall drive a vehicle on a highway at a speed in excess of the following limits:
(1) Thirty (30) miles per hour in any urban district;
(2) Fifty (50) miles per hour for trucks of one and one-half (1½) ton capacity or more in other locations; and
(3) Sixty (60) miles per hour for other vehicles in other locations;
(4) No vehicle which is over width, over length, or over height or the gross load of which is in excess of sixty-four thousand pounds (64,000 lbs), excluding the front axle, even if operated under a special permit, shall be operated in excess of thirty (30) miles per hour.
(d) Consistent with the requirements of subsection (a) of this section, the driver of every vehicle shall drive at an appropriate reduced speed when approaching and crossing an intersection or railway grade crossing, when approaching and going around a curve, when approaching the crest of a hill, when traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway, and when special hazard exists with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason of weather or highway conditions.
(e) In every charge of violation of this section, the complaint and the summons or notice to appear shall specify the speed at which the defendant is alleged to have driven and the prima facie speed applicable within the district or location.
(f) No person shall operate any motor-driven cycle at any time mentioned in § 27-36-204(a) at a speed greater than thirty-five (35) miles per hour unless such motor-driven cycle is equipped with a headlamp or headlamps which are adequate to reveal a person or vehicle at a distance of three hundred feet (300¢) ahead.
(g) The provisions of this section shall not be construed to relieve the plaintiff in any civil action from the burden of proving negligence upon the part of the defendant as the proximate cause of the accident.
History. Acts 1937, No. 300, § 51; Pope's Dig., § 6709; Acts 1939, No. 179, § 1; 1959, No. 307, § 33; 1963, No. 557, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 75-601.
Cross References. Penalty for violation of 1959 amendatory act, § 27-50-305.
Case Notes
Applicability.
Duties of Drivers.
Instructions.
Jury Questions.
Manslaughter.
“National” Speed Limit.
Negligence.
-Contributory.
-Evidence.
Ordinary Care.
Probable Cause.
Proximate Cause.
Reasonable and Prudent Driving.
Truck Tractors.
Witnesses.
In the absence of a showing that a special hazard existed on the highway or that there were signs specifying a particular speed, the statutory speed mentioned in this section would control. Elmore v. Dillard, 227 Ark. 260, 298 S.W.2d 338 (1957).
It was held to be the duty of the driver of an automobile on the streets of a city to keep his vehicle under such control as to be able to check the speed or stop it absolutely if necessary to avoid injury to others where danger could reasonably be expected or was apparent. Madding v. State, 118 Ark. 506, 177 S.W. 410 (1915) (decision under prior law).
It was held to be the duty of an automobile driver when going around a corner or approaching a curve, where his view was obstructed, to reduce his speed and take such care as the situation demanded. Bona v. S.R. Thomas Auto Co., 137 Ark. 217, 208 S.W. 306 (1919) (decision under prior law).
If rise is high enough to block driver's view of the road ahead, it is his statutory duty to reduce his speed in approaching the crest of the hill. Greyhound Lines v. Harmon, 239 Ark. 1031, 396 S.W.2d 291 (1965).
Instruction on former speed statute in negligence case was proper as against contention that instruction was on wrong statute where two statutes were substantially the same. Graves v. Jewell Tea Co., 180 Ark. 980, 23 S.W.2d 972 (1930) (decision under prior law).
An instruction, in an action for damages received in a collision, that, if the defendant was operating his automobile in a residential district at a speed greater than 20 miles per hour and such speed was the proximate cause of the collision and damages, the jury should return a verdict for the plaintiff was erroneous, as it made the violation of the traffic law negligence per se instead of leaving to the jury to consider the violation with the other facts and circumstances in determining whether the defendant was negligent. Herring v. Bollinger, 181 Ark. 925, 29 S.W.2d 676 (1930) (decision under prior law).
An instruction authorizing recovery by a passenger if a motorist drove at excessive speed and recklessly failed to keep his automobile under control and failed to exercise ordinary care for a passenger's safety was not objectionable as abstract, misleading, or erroneous. Hammond v. Hamby, 191 Ark. 780, 87 S.W.2d 1000 (1935) (decision under prior law).
Instruction that plaintiff would be guilty of negligence if he could not bring his car to a standstill within the distance in which he could plainly see parked cars was erroneous, since it was for jury to determine whether speed, under conditions existing, was reasonable and prudent. Kirby v. Swift & Co., 199 Ark. 442, 134 S.W.2d 865 (1939).
Where defendant was charged with involuntary manslaughter for reckless driving, the court properly refused an instruction of the defendant to the effect that if defendant was exercising due care and was not driving over posted highway speed limit the jury should acquit the defendant, as posted speed limit only fixed the maximum speed allowed and did not give the defendant the right to drive that fast under any and all conditions, and specifically under the conditions indicated by the evidence in the particular case. Campbell v. State, 215 Ark. 785, 223 S.W.2d 505 (1949).
Where a motorcycle ridden by a minor and a car driven by the defendant collided, it was not reversible error to refuse to instruct the jury that a minor should not be held to the same standard of care as an adult and that a higher degree of care is owed to minors, as this section and §§ 27-16-204, 27-16-206, 27-16-207, 27-51-208 - 27-51-211, and 27-51-308, pertaining to safety on the highways, disclose no distinction between the degree of care to be exercised by a minor and an adult. Harrelson v. Whitehead, 236 Ark. 325, 365 S.W.2d 868 (1963).
In a wrongful death action brought by the personal representative of the guest passenger of a deceased automobile driver, an instruction that violation of this section by the driver, if established by the evidence, could be considered by the jury in determining whether or not the driver was guilty of willful or wanton misconduct in the operation of the vehicle was properly refused, as it would have led the jury to the erroneous belief that such violation was evidence of willful and wanton misconduct. Shearer v. Newsom, 250 Ark. 33, 463 S.W.2d 642 (1971).
Where collision between vehicles occurred when one vehicle made left turn without signal and was struck by car coming in other direction and suit was brought by driver of the latter car, it was not error for the court to give, at the plaintiff's request, an instruction that explains the duty of a driver to keep a lookout, to keep his vehicle under control, and to drive at a speed no greater than is reasonable in the circumstances. Courson v. Chandler, 258 Ark. 904, 529 S.W.2d 864 (1975).
A trial court properly refuses to instruct jury under this section concerning speed limit on highway where accident occurs when no proof is given as to the speed limit. Miller v. Tipton, 272 Ark. 1, 611 S.W.2d 764 (1981).
Where there was testimony concerning the existence of a curve, the existence of an intersection, at least some suggestion of the proximity of the curve to the intersection, the speed at which the driver was traveling, and the effect of her failure to slow in the curve, the proffered instruction regarding negligence was a correct statement of the law, was relevant in the circumstances of the case, and it should have been given. Parker v. Holder, 315 Ark. 307, 867 S.W.2d 436 (1993).
Whether or not driver of an automobile was driving at a reckless or careless speed is a question for the jury, under proper instructions. Elmore v. Dillard, 227 Ark. 260, 298 S.W.2d 338 (1957).
It is up to the jury to decide whether a reasonably prudent individual would have checked his speed when approaching a person near the edge of the main traveled portion of the highway. Thomas v. Newman, 262 Ark. 42, 553 S.W.2d 459 (1977).
One driving an automobile on highway while drunk at a greater rate of speed than allowed by former statute could be found guilty of involuntary manslaughter if he caused another's death. White v. State, 164 Ark. 517, 262 S.W. 338 (1924); Fields v. Freeman, 177 Ark. 807, 8 S.W.2d 436 (1928) (decisions under prior law).
Whereas the 55 mile per hour limit was adopted by the State Highway Commission which determined that the suggested national standard was in conformity with its own engineering and traffic investigations, the speed limit was not an unconstitutional infringement by the United States Congress. Neikirk v. State, 260 Ark. 526, 542 S.W.2d 282 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 909, 97 S. Ct. 1183 (1977).
Where a driver who had been driving for approximately 10 hours was unable to stop his truck and thereby avoid striking another vehicle because of fog and wet, slick pavement, he was driving at a rate of speed greater than was prudent and reasonable under existing conditions and therefore was guilty of negligence. Sunday v. Burk, 172 F. Supp. 722 (W.D. Ark. 1959).
Contributory negligence of parties held equal, and so neither party could recover against the other. Easley v. Inglis, 233 Ark. 589, 346 S.W.2d 206 (1961).
An individual who operated his car at such speed that he was unable to stop in time to avoid another person who was emerging from a private driveway in full view violated this section and was guilty of contributory negligence. Kelly v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 118 (W.D. Ark. 1964).
The provisions of former statute prescribing speed limits were to be considered by a jury in determining whether one or both of two colliding cars were being negligently driven at the time a person was injured. Carter v. Brown, 136 Ark. 23, 206 S.W. 71 (1918) (decision under prior law).
The violation of state traffic statutes was held to be merely evidentiary of negligence and did not constitute negligence per se. Fields v. Freeman, 177 Ark. 807, 8 S.W.2d 436 (1928); Union Sec. Co. v. Taylor, 185 Ark. 737, 48 S.W.2d 1100 (1932) (preceding decisions under prior law).
A violation of this section, while not conclusive of the issue, may be evidence of negligence on the part of the violator. Kisor v. Tulsa Rendering Co., 113 F. Supp. 10 (W.D. Ark. 1953).
Obeying the speed limit is not all that is required of drivers in the exercise of ordinary care. Thomas v. Newman, 262 Ark. 42, 553 S.W.2d 459 (1977).
Motion to suppress evidence was properly denied in a drug case where the evidence showed that a search based on a pretextual stop was valid; the officer had probable cause for the stop since the vehicle was speeding, consent to search was given by the registered owner, and the consent was not limited to exclude containers found inside the vehicle. Flores v. State, 87 Ark. App. 327, 194 S.W.3d 207 (2004).
Where driver of the following car ascertained that he could not pass leading car because of oncoming traffic and pulled in so closely behind leading car that he was unable to decrease his speed or stop when leading car decreased its speed without signal because of suddenly seeing a truck parked partly on highway and ran into the rear of the leading car, his action in driving too closely behind the leading car was an act of negligence which was the proximate cause of the accident. Waycaster v. Sorenson, 124 F. Supp. 892 (W.D. Ark. 1954).
Where defendant was driving in excess of the speed limit and plaintiff driving in front approached intersection at which he intended to turn left and after giving a proper signal yielded the right-of-way to approaching vehicles before turning left, but the defendant in the following vehicle not being able to stop swerved into the other lane of traffic and struck plaintiff after he had almost completed his left turn, plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence; rather the negligence of the defendant was the proximate cause of the collision. Dearing v. Ferrell, 165 F. Supp. 508 (W.D. Ark. 1958).
Reasonable and Prudent Driving.
The statement that the criterion of a prudent driver is not his ability to skirt the outer edges of the law succinctly outlines one of the tests to be used in determining whether or not the driver is driving in a reasonable and prudent manner as required by this section. Reppeto v. Raymond, 172 F. Supp. 786 (W.D. Ark. 1959).
A truck tractor being operated without a trailer is still a truck, and not a passenger vehicle; hence its operation is governed by the law relating to speed of trucks. Rapert v. State, 215 Ark. 768, 223 S.W.2d 192 (1949).
It was held that nonexperts could testify that a vehicle was running unusually fast. Bowen v. State, 100 Ark. 232, 140 S.W. 28 (1911) (decision under prior law).
Cited: Billingsley v. Westrac Co., 246 F. Supp. 356 (W.D. Ark. 1965); Billingsley v. Westrac Co., 365 F.2d 619 (8th Cir. Ark. 1966); Dugal v. Commercial Std. Ins. Co., 456 F. Supp. 290 (W.D. Ark. 1978); Rodriquez v. State, 299 Ark. 421, 773 S.W.2d 821 (1989).