(a) (1) No vehicle shall be driven to the left side of the center of the roadway in overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction unless the left side is clearly visible and is free of oncoming traffic for a sufficient distance ahead to permit overtaking and passing to be completely made without interfering with the safe operation of any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction or any vehicle overtaken.
(2) In every event, the overtaking vehicle must return to the right-hand side of the roadway before coming within one hundred feet (100¢) of any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction.
(b) No vehicle shall, in overtaking and passing another vehicle or at any other time, except upon a one-way roadway, be driven to the left side of the roadway, under the following conditions:
(1) When approaching the crest of a grade or upon a curve in the highway where the driver's view along the highway is obstructed;
(2) When approaching within one hundred feet (100¢) of or traversing any intersection or railroad grade crossing;
(3) When the view is obstructed upon approaching within one hundred feet (100¢) of any bridge, viaduct, or tunnel;
(4) Where official signs are in place directing that traffic keep to the right, or a distinctive center line is marked, which distinctive lines also so direct traffic as declared in the sign manual adopted by the State Highway Commission.
History. Acts 1937, No. 300, § 60; Pope's Dig., § 6718; Acts 1959, No. 307, § 26; 1971, No. 161, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 75-611.
Cross References. Penalty for violation of 1959 amendatory act, § 27-50-305.
Case Notes
Instructions.
Negligence.
Proximate Cause.
Violation.
In a wrongful death action brought by the personal representative of the guest passenger of a deceased automobile driver, an instruction that violation of this section by the driver, if established by the evidence, could be considered by the jury in determining whether or not the driver was guilty of willful or wanton misconduct in the operation of the vehicle was properly refused, as it would have led the jury to the erroneous belief that such violation was evidence of willful and wanton misconduct. Shearer v. Newsom, 250 Ark. 33, 463 S.W.2d 642 (1971).
Driver of overtaking car was not guilty of negligence as a matter of law in attempting to pass slowly driven car at railroad intersection where driver of front car made left turn without indicating his intentions by manual signal. Hagan v. Knowles, 223 Ark. 590, 267 S.W.2d 514 (1954).
Where defendant was driving in excess of the speed limit and plaintiff driving in front approached intersection at which he intended to turn left and after giving a proper signal yielded the right-of-way to approaching vehicles before turning left, but the defendant in the following vehicle not being able to stop swerved into the other lane of traffic and struck plaintiff after he had almost completed his left turn, plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence and the negligence of the defendant was the proximate cause of the collision. Dearing v. Ferrell, 165 F. Supp. 508 (W.D. Ark. 1958).
In action for personal injury, evidence that boy ran out of his home and into street some distance from intersection and that he ran in front of a truck and then in front of defendant's automobile, which was in the process of passing the truck, held not to show negligence, absent evidence of speeding or failure to keep a lookout, or that driver saw the boy as he darted past the truck in front of the automobile, or that driver did not apply brakes and stop the car as quickly as possible. Lowe v. Ivy, 204 Ark. 623, 164 S.W.2d 429 (1942).
In action for injuries sustained when defendant's truck started passing a bus and ran into plaintiff's car almost head on, evidence was sufficient to justify the jury, in a finding that the driver of the truck was negligent in failing to keep a proper lookout or in failing to observe the provisions of this section. Franklin v. Badinelli, 205 Ark. 265, 168 S.W.2d 397 (1943).
Collision with another vehicle proceeding in same direction, which occurred on or near bridge, held due to negligence in attempting to pass another vehicle while within 100 feet of a bridge. Nicholas v. Bingamon, 219 Ark. 748, 244 S.W.2d 782 (1952).
An automobile driver's negligence in attempting to pass a truck ahead of him while descending a hill was held to be the sole proximate cause of a collision with an approaching truck. Universal Auto. Ins. Co. v. Denton, 185 Ark. 899, 50 S.W.2d 592 (1932) (decision under prior law).
Where the plaintiff was struck by a passing car at a point where there was no room for the car to pass without striking the plaintiff on account of the defendant's truck obstructing the highway, the causal connection between the defendant's negligence and the injury was not broken. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. McAnulty, 185 Ark. 970, 50 S.W.2d 577 (1932) (decision under prior law).
At most, the violation of this section would be only evidence of negligence. Lowe v. Ivy, 204 Ark. 623, 164 S.W.2d 429 (1942).